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This paper develops a North-South product model in which Southern imitation and the North-South
flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) are endogenously determined. In the model, a strengthening
of IPR protection in the South reduces the rate of imitation, which, in turn, increases the flow of FDI.
The increase in FDI more than offsets the decline in production undertaken by Southern imitators,
so that the South’s share of goods produced by the global economy increases. Furthermore, real wages
of Southern workers increase even though prices of goods produced by multinationals exceed those
of Southern imitators. The preceding results hold when Northern innovation is endogenously determined;
in addition, the rate of innovation increases with a strengthening of Southern IPR protection.
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How does the strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection
by developing countries impact their industrial development? How does it
a⁄ect their ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? These and re-
lated questions have been at the heart of an ongoing debate that was brought
into sharp relief during the negotiations preceding the rati￿cation of the
WTO￿ s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) in 1995. Opposition to stronger IPR regimes in developing coun-
tries rests on two general arguments. First, there is concern that consumer
welfare may be adversely impacted by enhancing the monopoly powers of
innovators. Second, there is fear that stronger IPR protection in develop-
ing countries will hamper their ability to absorb foreign technologies without
having any appreciable e⁄ect on Northern innovation.1 On the other side,
TRIPS supporters argue that stronger IPRs world-wide will not only increase
incentives for innovation but also foster industrial development in developing
countries by encouraging multinationals to shift production there. In this pa-
per, we seek to illuminate this important debate by developing a North-South
product cycle model in which Southern imitation as well as the North-South
￿ ow of FDI respond endogenously to changes in the degree of Southern IPR
protection available to Northern ￿rms. Building on the research tradition
established by Grossman and Helpman (1991), the model provides a uni￿ed
framework for assessing some of the key arguments for and against stronger
IPR regimes in developing countries.
The theoretical product cycle literature on the e⁄ects of Southern IPR
protection has been built on two types of growth models analyzed in great
detail in Grossman and Helpman (1991) ￿the variety expansion model and
the quality ladders model. Important contributions to this literature were
subsequently made by Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998) both of which uti-
1For example, a critic of stronger IPR enforcement in developing countries may argue
that the rapid postwar industrialization in East Asian countries such as Japan and South
Korea was achieved under relatively weak IPR regimes and that a premature imposition
of a strong IPR regime could retard the industrial development of today￿ s developing
countries. See Maskus (2000), who notes these arguments, and the overview and evidence
presented in Ordover (1991) and Maskus and McDaniel (1999). On South Korea, see
Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman (1985). For criticisms of stronger IPRs which stress static
welfare losses, see McCalman (2001) and Chaudhuri et al. (2006).
1lized the variety expansion model and Glass and Saggi (2002) who adopted
the quality ladders approach. This research established that the e⁄ects of
increased IPR protection in the South on the Northern rate of innovation
depend very much on whether production shifts to the South via imitation
of Northern ￿rms or via North-South FDI. Furthermore, Helpman (1993)
forcefully drove home the point that while stronger Southern IPR protection
can indeed increase the pace of Northern innovation, such a policy change
does not necessarily bene￿t the South since it reallocates production in fa-
vor of Northern ￿rms whose prices tend to be higher than those of Southern
ones. Thus, international production shifting matters not just for the nature
and the extent of innovation but also welfare. Accordingly, we develop a
North-South product cycle model with two important features. First, Like
Lai (1998), the level of North-South FDI responds endogenously to changes
in the degree of Southern IPR protection. Second, like Grossman and Help-
man (1991b), imitation is treated as a costly activity and the Southern rate
of imitation is endogenously determined.2
To ease the exposition of our main results and to focus on the e⁄ects of
Southern IPR protection on activities that occur in the South ￿i.e. Southern
imitation, production by local ￿rms, and production by Northern multina-
tionals ￿we ￿rst analyze a benchmark model in which imitation and FDI are
endogenous whereas innovation is exogenously given. The results obtained in
this benchmark model are then shown to hold when the rate of Northern in-
novation is endogenously determined. Apart from tractability, an important
advantage of the simpler model is that it allows us to analyze the e⁄ects of
a strengthening of Southern IPR protection when it does not have any e⁄ect
on the Northern rate of innovation. This is important because opposition to
stronger IPRs in the South is often based on the premise that since Northern
innovation is unlikely to respond to changes in the South￿ s IPR regime, the
South does not have much to gain from such a policy change. As our analysis
below shows, this position is not entirely correct.
Making both imitation and FDI endogenous helps push forward the lit-
erature on North-South product cycle models of international trade. Fur-
thermore, since imitation is a costly activity in the real world, analyses that
treat it as exogenous fail to capture how changes in the Southern IPR regime
2Helpman (1993) noted that ￿...imitation is an economic activity much the same as
innovation; it requires resources and it responds to economic incentives...￿ .
2alter the allocation of Southern resources among imitation and production.
In addition to realism, an important reason for treating imitation as an en-
dogenous activity is that North-South product cycle models with exogenous
imitation have yielded remarkably di⁄erent conclusions regarding the rela-
tionship between imitation and innovation from those that have treated it as
endogenous. In a model with endogenous imitation and innovation, Gross-
man and Helpman (1991b) uncovered a positive relationship between the two
activities while Lai (1998) found that a decline in the (exogenously given)
rate of imitation leads to an increase in innovation if Northern ￿rms can
undertake FDI in the South.3 Our model sheds light on the relationship
between innovation and imitation when both FDI and imitation are endoge-
nously determined.
In our model, a strengthening of IPR protection in the South reduces
the incentive of Southern ￿rms to imitate Northern multinationals. This
decline in imitation makes the South a more attractive location for Northern
multinationals. Furthermore, we ￿nd that the intra-regional reallocation of
Southern production (from local imitators to Northern multinationals) that
results from a strengthening of Southern IPR protection is dominated by the
accompanying inter-regional reallocation of production: in other words, the
share of the global basket of goods produced in the South increases with a
strengthening of Southern IPR protection.
Our analysis also provides some interesting insights with respect to the
e⁄ects of Southern IPR protection on prices and wages in the two regions.
First, by making the South a more attractive location for production and
thereby shifting labor demand from the North to the South, a strengthening
of IPR protection by the South lowers the North￿ s relative wage.4 Second,
since Northern multinationals charge lower prices relative to ￿rms that pro-
duce in the North, the increase in FDI helps lower prices. However, this
bene￿cial e⁄ect on prices is partially o⁄set by the intra-regional reallocation
of Southern production from local imitators to multinationals since a typical
3It is worth noting here that results also depend upon the type of innovation being
considered: the quality ladders model of Glass and Saggi (2002) and Glass and Wu (2007)
behave rather di⁄erently from the variety expansion models analyzed in our paper.
4This result contrasts with those of Krugman (1979) and Grossman and Helpman
(1991b) who found a negative relationship between Southern imitation and the North￿ s
relative wage. Our result di⁄ers because imitation targets multinationals in our model
whereas it targets Northern producers in theirs.
3imitator charges a lower price than a multinational. Due to the nature of
pricing behavior under Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) preferences (prices are mark-ups
over marginal costs), these changes in prices and nominal wages translate
into clear-cut e⁄ects on real wages in the two regions: while Northern real
wages decline due to stronger Southern IPR protection, Southern real wages
increase. More speci￿cally, the purchasing power of Southern workers in
terms of Northern goods increases whereas their ability to purchase goods
produced by Southern imitators and multinationals remains una⁄ected.
As noted earlier, a key argument in favor of weak IPR protection in the
South is that Southern imitation lowers prices. Since Southern imitators
price below Northern multinationals, this channel is also operative in our
model. However, this argument ignores the labor market e⁄ects of interna-
tional production shifting induced by stronger IPR protection in the South.
By contrast, in our model, a strengthening of IPR protection by the South
raises real wages of its workers.5
In Section 4 of the paper we show that all of the preceding results re-
garding wages, prices, and the allocation of production across regions as well
as within the South continue to hold when the Northern rate of innovation
is endogenously determined. The main additional result that emerges under
endogenous innovation is that a tightening of IPR protection in the South
raises the rate of innovation. As in Lai (1998), this happens due to two rea-
sons. One, the reduction in imitation risk increases the duration for which
Northern multinationals enjoy their pro￿t stream and since all Northern ￿rms
are free to become multinationals, the reward to innovation goes up. Second,
the reduction in imitation risk implies a greater North-South ￿ ow of FDI and
this helps move Northern resources from production into innovation.
The relationship between FDI and IPR protection has received signif-
icant empirical scrutiny in the literature.6 As the survey by Park (2008)
notes, as far as US data is concerned, there appears to be a clear positive
relationship between the degree of IPR enforcement in developing countries
and investment by US ￿rms ￿see, for example, Lee and Mans￿eld (1996) and
Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004). Results derived from non-US data portray a
5The real wage e⁄ects captured by our model would not arise in partial equilibrium
models that ignore the labor market e⁄ects of IPR reforms. Furthermore, such e⁄ects
should only be expected to arise when IPR reforms are undertaken on an economy-wide
basis as opposed to being focused on a few sectors.
6For a nuanced and detailed discussion of this literature, see Maskus (2000).
4more mixed picture: while Mayer and P￿ster (2001) ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of
stronger patent rights on location decisions of French multinationals, Javorcik
(2004) ￿nds that stronger patent rights in Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union states have a positive e⁄ect on FDI in high-technology sectors. The
most recent and perhaps the most relevant empirical study for our purposes
is that by Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, and Saggi (2007). They investigate the
impact of IPR reform on multinational production by analyzing the responses
of U.S. multinationals to a series of well-documented IPR reforms by sixteen
countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Consistent with our model, they ￿nd that
U.S.-based multinationals expand the scale of their activities in reforming
countries after IPR reform. They also analyze U.N. industry-level data from
reforming countries and show that industry-level value added increases after
reforms, particularly in technology-intensive industries.7
Given the central role of FDI in our model, it is worth noting that, consis-
tent with a large number of empirical studies discussed in Markusen (1995),
we also ￿nd that an increase in the productivity of Northern R&D leads to
an increase in the ￿ ow of FDI as well as in the sales of Northern multina-
tionals. Furthermore, we show that the use of FDI incentives by the South
in the form of a reduction in the tax rate on the pro￿ts earned by multina-
tionals has e⁄ects quite like those of IPR reform: it increases North-South
FDI, real wages in the South, as well as the Northern rate of innovation.
These results not only help clarify the structure of our model but are also
quite relevant because incentives toward FDI are widespread in the global
economy (UNCTAD, 2003) and a host of recent ￿rm-level empirical studies
document a negative relationship between FDI (particularly by US ￿rms)
and host country tax rates.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our bench-
mark model. Sections 3 describes the e⁄ects of a strengthening of Southern
7Following Feenstra and Rose (2000), they also construct for each reforming country an
annual count of ￿initial export episodes￿￿the number of 10-digit commodities for which
recorded U.S. imports from a given country exceed zero for the ￿rst time. This serves as
a rough indicator of the net rate at which production shifts to the reforming countries,
capturing changes in multinational production as well as indigenous imitation. This net
rate of production shifting increases sharply after IPR reform, suggesting that any decline
in indigenous imitation is more than o⁄set by the increase in the range of goods produced
by multinational a¢ liates.
8See, for example, Desai et. al. (2004) and Mutti and Grubert (2004).
5IPR protection on FDI, Southern production, wages, and prices. Section 4
presents the fully endogenous model and also considers the e⁄ects of South-
ern tax reductions toward Northern multinationals. Section 5 concludes while
Section 6 constitutes the appendix.
2 Model
Consider a world comprised of two regions: North and South. Labor is the
only factor of production and region i￿ s labor endowment equals Li, i = N;S.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991b), preferences are identical in the two
regions and a representative consumer chooses instantaneous expenditure














￿r(￿￿t)I(￿)d￿ + A(t) for all t (2)
where ￿ denotes the rate of time preference; r the nominal interest rate; I(￿)
instantaneous income; and A(t) the current value of assets. The instanta-









where x(j) denotes the consumption of good j; n the number of goods avail-
able and 0 < ￿ < 1.
As is well known, under the above assumptions, the consumer￿ s optimiza-
tion problem can be broken down into two stages. First, he chooses how to
allocate a given spending level across all available goods. Second, he chooses
the optimal time path of spending. The instantaneous utility function D
implies that the elasticity of substitution between any two goods is constant
and equals " = 1














Furthermore, as is well known, under the two-stage procedure the optimal




= r ￿ ￿ (6)
i.e. nominal consumption spending grows at a rate equal to the di⁄erence
between the interest rate and the subjective rate of time preference.
2.1 Product market
Three types of ￿rms produce goods: Northern ￿rms (N), Northern multina-
tionals (M), and Southern imitators (S). Denote ￿rms by J where J = N;
M, or S. Northern ￿rms can either produce in the North or the South. A
￿rm needs one worker to produce a unit of output in the North, whereas
￿ ￿ 1 workers per unit of output are needed in the South. Intuitively, this is
due to the costs of coordinating decisions over large distances and operating
in unfamiliar foreign environments. Indeed, the theory of the multinational
enterprise argues that such ￿rms rely on ￿ ownership￿advantages derived from
technological assets and/or brand names in order to o⁄set the disadvantages
they face relative to local ￿rms (see Markusen, 1995).
Given the constant elasticity demand functions, it is straightforward to









Southern ￿rms can produce only those goods that they have success-
fully imitated and they need one worker to produce one unit of output. If






Note that this price can be sustained if and only if it lies below the multina-




S , ￿￿ > 1:
7In what follows, we assume ￿￿ > 1.9
Let xJ denote the output level of ￿rm J where J = N;M, or S. We know






























































2.2 FDI and Imitation
Of the n goods that exist, nN are produced in the North, nM are produced
in the South by Northern multinationals, and nI are produced by Southern
imitators. Let nS ￿ nI + nM denote all goods produced in the South. In
what follows, we will think of the level of Southern industrial development
as roughly corresponding to the Southern share of global manufacturing; i.e.,
the ratio of goods produced in the South to the number of goods that exist
at a point in time. Since this measure of industrial development explicitly
9When ￿￿ < 1, a Southern imitator limit prices the Northern ￿rm whose product it
has copied by setting its price equal to the Northern ￿rm￿ s marginal cost ￿wS.
8includes the activities of a¢ liates of Northern multinationals, the advance of
Southern industrial development in our model depends on the rate of FDI.






i.e. ￿ denotes the rate of increase of the stock of imitated goods relative
to the total number of goods produced by Northern multinationals. Since
both multinationals and Southern imitators produce in the South, imitation
simply transfers ownership of a good (and the associated ￿ ow of pro￿ts) from
the hands of a multinational to a Southern imitator.






where nN denotes the number of goods produced in the North. In other
words, at each instant, the the total stock of goods produced in the South
increases by ￿nN. Note that this measures the in￿ ow of North-South FDI
because imitation only targets Northern multinationals and does not, by
itself, lead to North-South production shifting.
Like Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and Lai (1998), we study a steady
state equilibrium in which prices, nominal spending, and all product cate-


























To facilitate exposition, we initially analyze our model under the assumption
that the rate of innovation g is exogenously given and then in Section 4
analyze the fully endogenous model.
Equations (6), and (14) through (15) imply that in steady state the in-
terest rate equals the sum of the subjective discount rate and the growth
rate:
r = ￿ + g


































Note from above that since future products creates competition for existing
products, an increase in the rate of innovation (g) reduces the life-time value
of a Northern ￿rm.
While it is cheaper to produce in the South (as we show below, the South-
ern relative wage is lower in equilibrium), shifting production to the South





￿ + ￿ + g
(19)
As is clear, in calculating the value of a multinational ￿rm, the ￿ ow pro￿t
￿M is discounted not just by the e⁄ective interest rate (which equals ￿ +
g) but also by the rate of imitation ￿. As in Lai (1998), we assume that
imitation targets only Northern multinationals. In other words, the risk
faced by Northern ￿rms that refrain from shifting production to the South
has been normalized to zero. In reality, Northern ￿rms that do not undertake
FDI can also have their technologies imitated, but the risk of imitation they
face is probably lower than that of multinational ￿rms that produce in the
South. As is known from the work of Mans￿eld (1994) and Maskus (2000),
multinational ￿rms indeed internalize the risk of imitation that they face due
to weak IPR protection in host countries.10
Finally, the lifetime value of a Southern producer (i.e. the reward earned






10Our core results would still hold if the risk of imitation of Northern ￿rms were set at
some constant rate greater than zero but less than that faced by multinational ￿rms.
102.3 Relative wage
Since all Northern ￿rms have the option of becoming multinationals, we must
have vN = vM which implies
￿M
￿N = 1 +
￿
￿ + g
Note immediately from above that if the risk of imitation is positive (i.e. ￿ >
0) then we must have ￿M > ￿N. This is intuitive: since any Northern ￿rm
is free to become a multinational, the ￿ ow pro￿t earned by a multinational
must be higher in order to compensate for the risk of imitation faced (only)
by multinationals.11









The last two equations allow us to write the Northern relative wage (wR)
as a function of the rate of innovation and imitation as well as some of the












As is clear, the relative wage in the North increases with the production dis-
advantage faced by Northern multinationals (￿) as well as with the Southern
rate of imitation (￿) since both of these factors discourage Northern ￿rms
from relocating production to the South. This reluctance to shift production
to the South increases the relative demand for Northern labor and therefore
North￿ s relative wage. As we noted earlier, this result di⁄ers from that of
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and is line with Lai (1998). Why do these
models yield such di⁄erent results regarding the determinants of the North-
South relative wage? In Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Southern imitation
of ￿rms producing in the North serves as the channel through which inter-
national reallocation of production (and therefore labor demand) occurs. By
11Indeed, since prices of Northern ￿rms and multinationals are marked up over their
respective marginal costs by the same amount (i.e. 1/￿) the relative sales of a typical




pNxN = 1 +
￿
￿+g.
11contrast, in our model as well as in Lai (1998) Southern imitation targets
multinational ￿rms and North-South FDI is the channel of international re-
allocation of production. In our model, by lowering the risk of imitation, a
strengthening of Southern IPR protection increases FDI and the demand for
Southern labor while it reduces demand for Northern labor. In Grossman
and Helpman (1991b), the opposite happens: as imitation declines, more
production stays in the North and less of it occurs in the South. Hence the
North-South relative wage behaves rather di⁄erently across these models.
2.4 Imitation incentives and Southern IPR protection
At any given point in time, the unit labor requirement in imitation is given
by
aI
nS. In other words, the unit labor requirement in imitation is assumed
to decline with the number of goods produced in the South (nS = nI +nM).
The idea underlying this formulation is that imitation and Northern FDI
generate knowledge spillovers for the South that lower the cost of imitation
over time. This decline in imitation cost is necessary to sustain imitation in
the long run since an ongoing expansion in the number of products in the
global economy reduces the pro￿tability of imitation over time.
We consider two di⁄erent formulations of Southern IPR protection. Under





where k ￿ 1 is an index of the degree of IPR protection in the South. The
idea underlying this formulation is that as IPR protection is strengthened,
imitation becomes a more costly activity for Southern ￿rms because evading
local enforcement of IPRs becomes more di¢ cult. Under our second for-
mulation, the cost function of imitation is given cI =
aIwS
nS and a Southern
imitator￿ s ￿ ow pro￿t equal ￿S
k = (1 ￿ k)￿S = (1 ￿ k)(￿ ￿ 1)wSxS where
0 ￿ k ￿ 1. Under this formulation, IPR policy is akin to a pro￿t tax on
imitators: the more stringent is IPR protection, the smaller the rents from
imitation. Alternatively, one could view k￿S as the share of its pro￿t stream
that an imitator must surrender to local authorities for them to willingly
turn a blind eye towards the violation of IPRs of Northern multinationals.













Substituting from (12) into the above equation and using (8) gives the sales





































The following lemma reports some important properties of the function A(￿;g):
Lemma 1: A(￿;g) < 1 and
@A(￿;g)




The conditions for general equilibrium are derived from the resource con-
straints in the two regions. In the North, when the rate of innovation is ex-
ogenously given, all labor is allocated to production. Let Li
d denote aggregate
labor demand in region i where i = N;S. Then LN
d ￿ nNxN. Substituting






















13It is obvious from (27) that aggregate labor demand in the North LN
d de-
creases in ￿. Furthermore, Lemma 1 implies that LN
d decreases in ￿. These
two properties of LN
d imply that in the (￿;￿) space, the Northern labor
market equilibrium condition, which we will refer to as the NN curve, is





d =LN = ￿
￿(￿+￿+g)
￿ < 0. Note the fol-
lowing properties of ￿N(￿;￿): (i) it is independent of the IPR index k; (ii)
increases in ￿ while it decreases in ￿ and (iii) is unde￿ned for ￿ = 0. Prop-
erty (ii) implies that the NN curve is convex in the (￿;￿) space whereas
property (iii) implies that it does not intersect the vertical axis. From (27)








Southern labor is allocated to imitation and production by multinationals





























Observe from (30) that, in steady state, labor demand in the South is
independent of the ￿ ow of North-South FDI ￿. This implies that in the
(￿;￿) space, the Southern labor market equilibrium condition (called the







The equilibrium allocation of resources in the global economy is given by
the intersection of the NN and SS curves.
3 E⁄ects of Southern IPR protection
In this section, we study the e⁄ects of a strengthening of Southern IPR
protection when the rate of innovation (g) is exogenously given. We begin by
12The explicit formula for the equilibrium rate of imitation with g exogenous is reported
in the appendix.
14establishing some crucial properties of the North-South ￿ ow of FDI. Solving









Observe immediately from (31) that holding ￿ constant the numerator
of the right hand side increases with g: recall from Lemma 1 that A(￿;g)
increases with g. Due to the same reason, the ratio ￿=g also increases in g.
This implies the following:
Remark 1: Holding constant the rate of imitation (￿), the ￿ow of FDI
(￿) to the South increases with the rate of Northern innovation:
@￿
@g > 0.
Furthermore, the elasticity of the ￿ow of FDI with respect to the rate of





In this context, it is worth noting that a large number of empirical studies
have demonstrated a strong positive correlation between innovation and FDI
and, as Markusen (1995) notes, this ￿nding is so pervasive that it has become
a cornerstone of the modern theory of the multinational ￿rm.
Suppose now that the South increases the degree of IPR protection (k)





















In other words, from the viewpoint of the South, holding constant the rates
of imitation (￿) and innovation (g), an increase in the degree of IPR pro-
tection (k) is an e⁄ective reduction in the real resources available (i.e. a
decline in LS
k ) since all three activities that the South is engaged in ￿imi-
tation, production by multinational ￿rms, and production by local imitators
￿would require more resources if k increases and ￿ remains unchanged. It
is intuitively obvious why an increase in the cost of imitation increases the
resources required to sustain a given level of imitation. But why do the two
production activities undertaken in the South also become more resource in-
tensive with an increase in the IPR index k? The intuition for this comes
from the free entry condition in imitation: as the cost of imitation increases,
the sales of a ￿rm that is successful in imitation also must increase in order
to maintain the zero pro￿t condition in imitation. Finally, the sales of a
15multinational (xM) are proportional to the sales of a Southern imitator (xM)







"(g + ￿￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿ + g)]
(￿ + g)2(1 ￿ ￿)￿
" > 0
because ￿
" > ￿ and ￿ < 1. Since aggregate labor demand in the South LS
d
increases with the rate of imitation ￿ and the e⁄ective labor supply (LS
k ) falls
with the Southern IPR index k, the rate of imitation ￿ must fall with k or
else the Southern labor market would fail to clear.
Now consider how an increase in k e⁄ects the NN curve. Since the slope
of this curve ￿N(￿;￿) is independent of k whereas the horizontal intercept
￿0 increases with k, the NN curve shifts outward with an increase in k. The
decline in the rate of imitation (i.e. the downward shift in the SS curve)
along with the outward shift in the NN curve yields:
Proposition 1: When the rate of innovation (g) is exogenously given, a
strengthening of Southern IPR protection lowers the rate of Southern imita-
tion (￿) and it increases the rate of North-South FDI (￿):
d￿
dk < 0 <
d￿
dk.
The logic behind Proposition 1 is easy to see. Recall from Lemma 1
that A(￿;g) decreases in ￿. Since ￿ decreases in k, it follows then that
kA(￿;g) increases in k. But with g ￿xed, equation (27) also implies that the
North-South ￿ ow of FDI ￿ necessarily increases with k or else the Northern
labor market cannot clear. Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1 in the (￿;￿)
space.13 With a strengthening of Southern IPR protection, the SS curve
shifts down while the NN curve shifts up and the equilibrium of the world
economy moves from point A to B, where the rate of Southern imitation is
lower whereas the rate of North-South FDI is higher.
13The following parameters were used to generate Figure 1: LS = 200; LN = 450;
aN = 1; ￿ = 1=10; ￿ = 2; and ￿ = 1=2. The unit labor requirement in imitation k:aI was







Figure 1: E⁄ects of an increase in Southern IPR protection on imitation and FDI
Since Proposition 1 is our core result from which most other results are
derived, it is worth checking whether it holds when Southern IPR protection
determines how much rent local imitators collect from their investment in
imitation as opposed to making imitation more costly. Let a Southern imita-
tor￿ s ￿ ow pro￿t from imitation equal ￿S
k = (1 ￿ k)￿S =
(1￿k)(1￿￿)wSxS
￿ where
k measures the degree of IPR protection and 0 ￿ k ￿ 1. It is straightforward
that in the Northern labor market equilibrium condition (27) we simply need
to replace 1=k by (1 ￿ k) whereas in the Southern labor market equilibrium
condition (30) the same substitution is needed in the second and third terms
of the LHS; in the ￿rst term of the same equation, k needs to be simply
replaced by 1. Since an increase in k in our pro￿t tax based formulation of
IPR protection has analogous e⁄ects to an in increase in k under our cost
based formulation, Proposition 1 holds under both formulations.
3.1 Southern industrial development and FDI
An important objective of this paper is to understand how a strengthening
of IPR protection in the South alters the distribution of production across
the two regions as well as between Northern multinationals and Southern
imitators. How Southern IPR protection a⁄ects the global allocation of pro-
duction depends on its e⁄ects on Southern imitation and the North-South
￿ ow of FDI. To see the e⁄ect of an increase in k on the international alloca-




￿+g. Since ￿ increases in k and g is
17exogenously ￿xed we must have:
Corollary 1 (Inter-regional Reallocation of Production): A strengthening
of Southern IPR protection increases the South￿ s share of the total basket of









g decreases with k, we can state the following result re-
garding the allocation of production within the South between multinationals
and Southern ￿rms:
Corollary 2 (Intra-regional Reallocation of Production): A strengthen-
ing of Southern IPR protection increases the share of Southern production





It is straightforward to show that the total value of multinational sales






Since the the rate of imitation (￿) falls with an increase in the degree of
Southern IPR protection, it implies that a strengthening of Southern IPR
protection leads to an increase in the aggregate sales of multinational ￿rms
relative to those of Southern imitators.
Now consider a comparison of total multinational sales relative to those






















g+￿, equation (33) implies that a typical multinational must
have higher relative sales compared to a Northern ￿rm(i.e. the ratio pMxM=pNxN
must exceed 1). Intuitively, since imitation only targets multinational ￿rms,
for a typical multinational to earn the same rate of return as a Northern ￿rm
producing in the North, the multinational must have a higher relative pro￿t
￿ ow. However, with a decline in the rate of imitation, this relative pro￿t ￿ ow
actually has to shrink in order to ensure multinationals and Northern ￿rms
earn the same rate of return. In other words, a strengthening of Southern
18IPR protection decreases the sales of a typical multinational ￿rm relative to
those of a Northern ￿rm.
In this context, one further subtlety that arises from general equilib-
rium considerations is worth noting: an decrease in the rate of imitation ￿
increases the relative Southern wage and therefore the cost of production
of multinationals relative to Northern ￿rms. However, since prices of both
types of ￿rms are mark-ups over their respective marginal costs, this cost
increase has a proportional e⁄ect on prices of multinationals relative to those
of Northern ￿rms. In other words, by increasing the South￿ s relative wage,
IPR reform increases the prices charged by multinationals relative to those
of Northern ￿rms and this translates into lower relative sales for a typical
multinational.
3.2 Real wages and the aggregate price index
What are the e⁄ects of a strengthening of IPR protection in the South on
real wages in the two regions? By de￿nition, the real wage e⁄ects of such
a policy change depends upon nominal wages in the two regions and the
prices of goods produced by three types of ￿rm: ￿rms located in the North,


























In other words, the Northern real wage in terms of goods produced by North-
ern ￿rms is una⁄ected by Southern IPR protection whereas in terms of the
other two goods, it moves in the same direction as the Northern relative wage
wR. We already know that Northern relative wage decreases as a result a
strengthening of Southern IPR protection since the rate of imitation ￿ falls
with such a policy change. This decline in the Northern relative wage wR
implies that a strengthening of Southern IPR protection decreases real wages
in the North.











In other words, the only e⁄ect on Southern real wages of a change in its
IPR policy is in terms of goods produced in the North. However, since wR
decreases with ￿, it implies that a strengthening of Southern IPR protection
increases real wages in the South. The general equilibrium nature of this
result deserves emphasis. A common argument in favor of weaker IPR pro-
tection in the South is that Southern imitation lowers prices and therefore
bene￿ts consumers. Since prices of Southern imitators are lower than those
of Northern multinationals, this channel is operative in our model as well.
However, the story does not end there: international production shifting that
results from a reduction in the rate of imitation also has labor market e⁄ects.
In our model, a strengthening of Southern IPR protection leads to a higher
Southern relative wage since the resulting decline in imitation risk makes
the South a more attractive location for Northern multinationals. Indeed,
changes in prices are dominated by the change in the Southern relative wage
so that the purchasing power of Southern workers in terms of goods produced
in the North increases whereas there is no change in their ability to purchase
goods produced in the South.
Despite an increase in real wages, Southern welfare does not necessarily
increase because the ￿ ow of utility equals the log of real spending (log u = log
E ￿ log P) and a reduction in pro￿ts of Southern imitators lowers Southern
income and can adversely impact Southern spending. While a complete
welfare analysis along the lines of Helpman (1993) is beyond the scope of the
paper, it is useful to consider how a strengthening of Southern IPR protection







































20While goods produced by multinationals are cheaper than those produced
by Northern ￿rms (pM < pN), it is the Southern imitators that produce the




g decreases with the degree
of Southern IPR protection (k) since imitation slows down while innova-




g decreases with k, i.e., the share
of global production that is in the hands of multinational ￿rms increases.
Furthermore, recall that a strengthening of Southern IPR protection shifts
production away from the North and towards the South (inter-regional re-
allocation). Since pM < pN, the inter-regional reallocation of production
from North to the South helps lower the overall price index. However, since
pM > pS, the intra-regional reallocation of Southern production in favor of
Northern multinationals and away from Southern imitators has the opposite
e⁄ect. This implies that if the inter-regional reallocation of production is
substantial, Southern imitation has the potential to partially bene￿t North-
ern consumers by lowering the aggregate price index P. Indeed, this is the
key reason why Helpman (1993) ￿nds that some amount of imitation is in the
interest of the North. However, in our model, since FDI also o⁄ers the poten-
tial for lowering prices, imitation is not as crucial for welfare purposes. This
is worth explaining in some detail. Unlike us, Helpman (1993) assumes that
the risk of imitation applies equally to Northern ￿rms and multinationals. As
a result, multinationals and Northern producers can coexist in equilibrium
only if the two regions have equal wages.14 Under such wage equalization,
FDI o⁄ers no reduction in costs of production and therefore has no price ef-
fects. By contrast, in our model, both FDI and imitation imply cost savings
and the allocation of production across regions as well as within the South
have implications for the aggregate price index.
We next study the e⁄ects of a strengthening of Southern IPR protection
when innovation is endogenous.
14Our model would yield the same result if the rate of imitation facing multinationals
and Northern producers were the same (i.e. ￿ = 0) and multinationals did not face any
frictions that hamper their ability to be as e⁄ective in production as local Southern ￿rms
(i.e. ￿ = 1).
214 The model with endogenous innovation
Note ￿rst that when the rate of innovation is endogenously determined, the
results obtained under the assumption of exogenous innovation (i.e. Propo-
sition 1 and Corollaries 1-2) continue to hold so long as a strengthening of
Southern IPR protection does not decrease the Northern rate of innovation
g. In what follows, we show that an increase in the Southern IPR protec-
tion index k actually increases the rate of innovation (Proposition 2). In
addition, we also show that an increase in R&D productivity of the North
increases both innovation and North-South FDI (Proposition 3) and that a
policy of attracting multinational ￿rms through a reduction in the pro￿t tax
imposed on them has e⁄ects quite similar to a strengthening of Southern IPR
protection.
4.1 Costly innovation
When innovation is endogenous and there is free entry into it, the value of a












where aN is the unit labor requirement in innovation and
wNaN
n measures the
up-front cost of product development. This formulation assumes that the
cost of designing new products falls with the number of products (n) that
have been invented. In other words, knowledge spillovers from innovation
sustain further innovation. This assumption is standard in the literature
(see Grossman and Helpman, 1991a and b, and Romer, 1990) and in its
absence growth cannot be sustained in the variety expansion model with
￿xed resources. This is because the ￿ ow pro￿t of a successful innovator
declines with the number of products invented and incentives for innovation
disappear in the long run if the cost of innovation does not also fall with an
increase in the number of products.

















wN = 1 (36)

















xS = 1 (37)













Substituting from (16) and (17) into the above equation gives us an equilib-
rium relationship between the three endogenous variables g, ￿, and ￿ and













Intuitively, this condition follows from the assumption of free entry into im-
itation and innovation and it ensures that neither activity leads to excess
pro￿ts for ￿rms that are successful in such activities.
Solving equation (39) for FDI ￿ ow ￿ in terms of the other two endogenous






Observe immediately from (40) that holding ￿ constant the denominator
of the right hand side increases with g: this is because ￿=g falls with g
whereas A(￿;g) increases (Lemma 1). This implies the following result:
Remark 2: Holding constant the rate of imitation (￿), factors that in-
crease the North-South ￿ow of FDI (￿) must also increase the rate of North-
ern innovation (g).
Since both innovation and FDI are endogenous, Remark 2 notes that the
￿ ow of FDI and the rate of innovation are positively related in our model.
23In this context, it is worth noting that a large number of empirical studies
have demonstrated that there is a positive correlation between innovation and
FDI; as Markusen (1995) notes, this ￿nding is so pervasive that it has become
a cornerstone of the modern theory of the multinational ￿rm. Furthermore,
since A(￿;g) decreases with ￿, we have:
Remark 3: Holding constant the rate of innovation (g), factors that
decrease the Southern rate of imitation (￿) must also increase the North-
South ￿ow of FDI (￿):
An important point to note is that since our model exhibits a negative
feedback between FDI and imitation and a positive feedback between FDI
and innovation, it necessarily implies a negative feedback between innovation
and imitation. This is an important property of the model which di⁄erenti-
ates it from the results of Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and aligns it with
those of Lai (1998).
Consider now the direct e⁄ect of Southern IPR protection on the North-
South ￿ ow of FDI. From (40) directly observe that the denominator in the
formula of ￿(￿;g) decreases with k so that we have:
Remark 4: Holding constant the rates of imitation (￿) and innova-
tion (g), the ￿ow of FDI (￿) to the South increases with a strengthening of
Southern IPR protection (i.e. an increase in k).
The intuition for this result comes from equation (38) which requires the
rate of return on innovation and imitation to equal each other. Since the
right hand side of this equation always equals 1, an increase in the IPR





￿+g) that occurs in the South for the cost of imitation to not increase
relative to the cost of innovation which in turn requires that the ￿ ow of FDI
￿ increases with the degree of IPR protection k.
It is well-known that multinational ￿rms conduct a large share of global
research and development (R&D). Indeed, a generation of empirical studies
have documented the positive correlation between FDI ￿ ows and R&D in-
vestment (Markusen, 1995). Given this, it is worth noting from equation
(40) that, holding constant the rate of innovation and imitation, an increase
24in the R&D productivity of Northern ￿rms (as measured by an decrease in
aN) implies a faster North-South ￿ ow of FDI. We later discuss the general
equilibrium response of FDI to an increase in Northern R&D productivity
taking into account its e⁄ects on the rates of imitation and innovation.
4.2 Southern IPR protection under endogenous inno-
vation
Assuming the rate of imitation is exogenously given, Lai (1998) has shown
that a decline in this rate increases Northern innovation and the rate of pro-
duction shifting to the South.15 A crucial question is whether this important
result holds when both imitation and innovation are endogenous and the un-
derlying exogenous variable is the degree of IPR protection (i.e. parameter
k). Under endogenous innovation, the Southern labor market equilibrium
condition (30) remains unaltered where in the North we now need to account







Substituting into the above resource constraint from the market measure








Equations (30), (39), and (42) de￿ne the steady state equilibrium of the
model in terms of the three endogenous variables: the rate of innovation g,
the rate of imitation ￿, and the rate of FDI ￿. All of the e⁄ects of increased
IPR protection in the South (i.e. an increase in k) are derived from the
e⁄ects on these endogenous variables. Using the equilibrium ￿ ow of FDI and
the two resource constraints, we can derive a system of two equations in two
unknowns that helps provide a graphical illustration of the consequences of
stronger IPR protection in the South.
Recall that the Southern labor market constraint is independent of the
￿ ow of FDI ￿. As before, let LS
d measure aggregate labor demand in the
South (given by the LHS of equation (30)). Recall that
@LS
d
@￿ > 0 ￿ i.e.
15In the appendix, we show how our model relates to Lai (1998).
25holding constant the rate of innovation g, aggregate labor demand in the
South increase with the rate of imitation ￿. Similarly, holding constant






kaI [￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿
" + ￿￿￿￿ + 2￿g￿ + ￿￿g2]
(￿ + g)2(1 ￿ ￿)￿
" > 0
where we have assumed that ￿ > ￿￿.
Thus, the Southern labor market constraint (i.e. the SS curve) is down-














In other words, since the South has only a ￿xed amount of labor resources, an
increase in the Southern rate of imitation ￿ implies that the rate of innovation







(￿ + ￿ + g)(1 ￿ ￿)￿
" > 0
i.e. the higher the rate of imitation ￿, the higher the demand for Northern
labor. The logic for this is as follows. Since FDI is endogenously determined,
a higher rate of imitation makes FDI less attractive to Northern ￿rms. For a
￿xed rate of innovation, the demand for Northern workers is inversely related
to the ￿ ow of FDI.
Next consider how an increase in the rate of innovation e⁄ects aggregate
labor demand in the North. Recall that demand for Northern labor comes
from innovation (LN
n ￿ aNg) and from production (LN
p ￿ nNxN). It is
obvious that an increase in g raises labor demand in innovation (LN
n ). On














which immediately implies that if
nN
n were to increase in g, then it must
be that LN
p (and therefore aggregate labor demand) in the North increases
26in g. Further note from above that if ￿ were independent of g, it would
immediately follow that
nN
n increases in g. This thought experiment is useful
for highlighting the role of the ￿ ow of FDI in our model: if the ￿ ow of FDI
￿ ow were invariant to the rate of innovation, labor demand in the North
would necessarily increase with the rate of innovation. However, Remark 2
notes that the ￿ ow of FDI and the rate of innovation are positively related.
This raises the possibility that
nN
n might decrease with g. Intuitively, such a
situation could arise since the elasticity of the ￿ ow of FDI with respect to the
rate of innovation exceeds unity. Despite this, we show in the appendix that





As a result, like the Southern labor market constraint, the Northern labor

















It is worth emphasizing the role FDI plays in this context: in the absence
of FDI, in a variety expansion product cycle model such as Grossman and
Helpman (1991b), the Northern market labor constraint is actually upward
sloping in the (g;￿) space. This is because when imitation is the only channel
via which production is reallocated internationally, an increase in the rate of
imitation frees up Northern labor for use in innovation thereby generating
a positive feedback between imitation and innovation. By contrast, in our
model imitation targets production by multinationals and by slowing down
FDI, an increase in the rate of imitation actually pulls Northern resources
out of innovation and into production.
For a unique steady state equilibrium to exist, the SS curve and the NN
curve must have a unique intersection in the (g;￿) space. We have already
noted that both curves are downward sloping. Neither curve intersects the
vertical axis and we show in the appendix that under minor conditions, the
horizontal intercept (gs) of the SS curve is larger than that (gn) of the
NN curve . The latter property means that when the rate of imitation is
near zero, the rate of innovation required for the Southern market to be
27in equilibrium is greater relative to the required rate of innovation for the
Southern market to be in equilibrium. This is quite intuitive: when the rate
of imitation is zero, Southern resources are utilized only by multinationals for
their production activities whereas Northern resources are used up in both
innovation and production. As a result, when imitation is non-existent labor
market equilibrium in the South calls for a greater rate of innovation than
that in the North since the only activity generating labor demand ￿i.e. FDI
￿is positively related to the rate of innovation.
Given these properties of the two curves, any intersection of the two
curves will be unique if the NN curve is steeper than the SS curve: i.e.
￿r ￿
￿ ￿￿N￿ ￿=
￿ ￿￿S￿ ￿ > 1. We can show that ￿r > 1 i⁄ aR ￿ aN=aI exceeds
some threshold a￿
R, where a￿
R is a function of exogenous parameters and the
rates of imitation and innovation. Furthermore, as ￿ approaches zero, a￿
R
can be shown to be decreasing in the rate of imitation ￿. In other words, for
￿ close to zero, the required threshold a￿
R is the highest (and therefore the
most di¢ cult to meet) at ￿ = 0. Next, it can be shown that at ￿ = ￿ = 0,
a￿
R decreases in ￿ and at the lowest feasible value of ￿ (which is 1=￿), the
condition aR > a￿
R is necessarily satis￿ed for all feasible ￿. Thus, we proceed
with the scenario where the NN curve is steeper than the SS curve and the
two curves have a unique intersection that pins down the equilibrium of the
global economy.
As was already noted, holding constant the rates of imitation (￿) and
innovation (g), an increase in the degree of Southern IPR protection (k)
increases labor demand in the South in all three activities (i.e. local imitation,
production by Southern ￿rms, and production by multinationals). This is
equivalent to an inward shift in the Southern labor market constraint in the
(g;￿) space. Further note that holding constant g and ￿, an increase in
k e⁄ects the Northern labor market constraint via its e⁄ect on the ￿ ow of
FDI ￿. Given that the ￿ ow of FDI increases in the Southern IPR index
k, it follows that labor demand in the North LN(￿;g) (i.e. the left hand
side of equation 42) decreases with k. The e⁄ect of a strengthening of IPR
protection in the South on equilibrium rates of imitation and innovation can
now be derived. As IPR protection in the South increases, the Southern
labor market constraint (i.e. the SS curve) shifts down while the Northern
constraint (i.e. the NN curve) shifts up. These shifts in the two constraints
deliver one of our key results:
28Proposition 2: A strengthening of IPR protection in the South decreases
the Southern rate of rate of imitation (￿) while it increases the Northern rate
of innovation (g):
d￿
dk < 0 <
dg
dk.







Figure 2: E⁄ects of an increase in Southern IPR protection on imitation and innovation
The NN curve illustrates the Northern resource constraint whereas the
SS curve denotes the Southern one. In Figure 2, the NN curve is relatively
steeper because of the fact that while the rate of innovation is determined pri-
marily by the size of the Northern economy (since only the North innovates),
the rate of imitation is determined primarily by the size of the Southern one
(since only the South imitates). Of course, the North-South ￿ ow of FDI is
what links the two resource constraints to each other.
Point A denotes the initial steady state equilibrium. Now suppose that
Southern IPR protection is strengthened (i.e. k increases). In Figure 2, this
implies an inward shift in the Southern resource constraint and an outward
shift in the Northern constraint. Why the Southern constraint shifts has al-
ready been explained: all three activities in the South become more resource
intensive and this e⁄ectively reduces the resource base. The Northern con-
straint shifts out because of the FDI response: as the ￿ ow of North-South FDI
16The following parameters were used to generate Figure 1: LS = 200; LN = 450;
aN = 1;aI = :6, ￿ = 1=10; ￿ = 2; and ￿ = 1=2. The index of Southern IPR protection k
was increased by 10% (from 1 to 1.1).
29increases, more Northern resources become available for innovation. The out-
ward shift in the Northern constraint is relatively smaller because the North
is a⁄ected via a single, indirect channel (i.e. through the response of North-
South ￿ ow of FDI) whereas the e⁄ect on the South is a more direct one and
it occurs via all three activities that take place there. As shown in Figure
2, these shifts in the two resource constraints caused by a strengthening of
IPR protection in the South imply that in the new steady state equilibrium
B the Southern rate of imitation is signi￿cantly lower than that at A while
the Northern rate of innovation is higher.17
Thus, from the perspective of the North, stronger Southern IPR enforce-
ment in our model generates a rather classical trade-o⁄ between a static
welfare loss and a dynamic welfare gain: the static loss being the decrease
in real wages (or in its terms of trade since the relative price of Northern
exports is determined by the relative wage) and the dynamic gain being the
increase in the rate of innovation. What is noteworthy, however, is that the
trade-o⁄ in the North results from changes in the IPR policy of the South.
We should emphasize that the properties of the model noted in Remarks
2 and 3 are quite crucial since these establish a positive feedback between
FDI and innovation and a negative feedback between these two variables
and the rate of imitation. As long as a strengthening of Southern IPR pro-
tection discourages imitation, its positive e⁄ects on innovation and FDI are
implied by Remark 3. For innovation and FDI to be a⁄ected negatively by
a strengthening of Southern IPR protection, our model would need to have
the somewhat strange property that an increase in the resource requirement
for imitation (as measured by kaI) increases the rate of Southern imitation.
Due to the complexity of the fully endogenous model, we cannot provide an
analytical proof that rules out this unlikely possibility; however, we have not
been able to ￿nd any sets of parameter values under which it arises.
Now brie￿ y consider the case where a Southern imitator￿ s ￿ ow pro￿t from
imitation equal ￿S
k = (1 ￿ k)￿S = (1 ￿ k)(￿ ￿ 1)wSxS where k determined
the degree of IPR protection and 0 ￿ k ￿ 1. Under such a formulation, the
Northern labor market equilibrium condition is unaltered whereas the other
17In a two-country model where both countries invest in labor saving innovation, Taylor
(1994) ￿nds that the global innovation and technology transfer are both higher when
countries o⁄er the same degree of IPR protection to innovating ￿rms regardless of their
national origin relative to when they o⁄er such protection to only their own ￿rms.
30two equilibrium conditions are slightly modi￿ed. In equation (39) we simply
need to replace 1=k by (1 ￿ k) whereas in equation (30) the same substitu-
tion is needed in the second and third terms of the LHS; in the ￿rst term
of the same equation, k needs to be simply replaced by 1. It is straightfor-
ward to show that results obtained under our cost based formulation of IPR
protection continue to hold under thus pro￿t-tax formulation.
Finally, we note how an improvement in R&D productivity (i.e. a decrease
in aN) a⁄ects the North-South ￿ ow of FDI as well as the global allocation
of production, once the e⁄ects on innovation and imitation are taken into
account. First note that a decrease in aN has no direct e⁄ect on the SS
constraint whereas the e⁄ect on the NN constraint is essentially the same as
that an increase in the Northern labor supply ￿i.e. in ￿gure 1, the NN curve
shifts out. This immediately implies that with an increase in Northern R&D
productivity, the rate of imitation decreases whereas the rate of innovation
increases. Relying on arguments similar to those used to derive the e⁄ects of
Southern IPR protection, we directly state the following:
Proposition 3: With an increase in the R&D productivity of Northern
￿rms (i.e. a decrease in aN), the rate of innovation, the North-South ￿ow
of FDI, the share of Southern production in the hands of Northern multina-
tionals, and the sales of multinationals relative to other ￿rms, all increase
whereas the rate of imitation decreases.
4.3 E⁄ects of FDI policies
Many countries implement policies designed to attract FDI, perhaps with the
hope of spurring local industrial development (see UNCTAD, 2003). Quite
often such policies take the form of ￿scal incentives under which multina-
tionals that invest locally are o⁄ered reduced tax rates. Are such policies
justi￿able? To address this question, suppose that the South undertakes a
policy of o⁄ering an incentive to Northern multinationals that lowers the
pro￿t tax t on Northern multinationals from. What are the consequences of
such a policy? First note that when such a pro￿t tax is in place, a typical
Northern multinational￿ s after-tax pro￿t equals
￿
M
t = (1 ￿ t)￿




￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ t)wSxM
￿
31It is straightforward to show that when a multinational￿ s pro￿t is ￿M
t (as














from where it is immediate that a reduction in the pro￿t tax t on multina-
tionals (which is the same as a tax incentive for FDI) increases the Southern
relative wage. The intuition is simple: the use of FDI incentives makes the
South a more attractive production location and shifts labor demand away
from the North in favor of the South.







(￿ + g)(1 ￿ t)
￿ + g + ￿
￿ 1
￿
Since At(￿;g) decreases in t, it is clear from above that holding constant
the rates of innovation (g) and imitation (￿), the North-South ￿ ow of FDI
(￿) increases with a decrease in the FDI tax rate t. Of course, how the
equilibrium ￿ ow of FDI responds to the use of an FDI incentive depends on
how the rates of innovation (g) and imitation (￿) respond to such a policy.
Note that the Southern resource constraint is una⁄ected by the FDI tax
rate t whereas the Northern constraint is a⁄ected via the North-South ￿ ow
of FDI. But since this ￿ ow is inversely related to the tax rate t, it implies
that a reduction in t results in an outward shift in the NN curve in ￿gure
1 without having any a⁄ect on the SS curve. This implies that a reduction
in the Southern tax rate t on multinationals increases the rate of innovation
(g) and the North-South ￿ow of FDI (￿) whereas it decreases the Southern
rate of imitation (￿).
In the presence of the FDI tax, equation (38) (which follows from free
















Since the term in square brackets increases with t, it must be that
nS
n
decreases with t. In other words, a Southern policy of attracting FDI via a
reduction in the tax rate t, increases the share of the global basket of goods




g, such a policy
change towards FDI also shifts production in favor of Northern multination-
als and away from Southern imitators. Finally, consider the labor market
consequences of such a policy. It follows immediately from the formula for
the North-South relative wage (see 43) that a reduction in t decreases the
South￿ s relative wage (1=wR
t ). Furthermore, such a policy change lowers real
wages in the North while increasing them in the South.
Corollary 3: A reduction in the Southern tax rate on multinationals
increases the South￿ s wage relative to the North as well as the real wages of
Southern workers.
Finally, note that the price e⁄ects of a reduction in the Southern tax rate
on multinationals are quite like those of a strengthening of its IPR protec-
tion: both types of policies lower prices of those goods whose production
shifts from the North to the South while increasing prices of those goods
whose production stays in the hands of multinationals as opposed to South-
ern imitators.
5 Conclusion
Opinions regarding the strengthening of IPR regimes in developing countries
required under the TRIPS agreement of the WTO vary remarkably across
individuals and nations. While the issue is multi-faceted and complex, the
following statement broadly captures the disparity in views regarding TRIPs:
developing countries have tended to argue that stronger IPR regimes in their
markets will have adverse e⁄ects on prices without having much of a positive
impact on innovation whereas developed countries have stressed that not
only innovation, but also FDI ￿ ows would respond strongly to such reforms.
In principle, an increase in FDI has the potential to o⁄er two major sources
of welfare gains. One, it can lower prices by shifting production to lower
cost locations. Two, FDI has the potential to encourage Southern industrial
development by introducing new technologies into the South. In this paper,
we have presented a general equilibrium North-South product cycle model
with a degree of endogenity that allows us to assess these arguments in a
uni￿ed framework.
33The major results of our core model are as follows. First, we ￿nd that a
strengthening of IPR protection in the South discourages imitation. Second,
it increases FDI to a degree that the Southern production base actually ex-
pands ￿i.e. the decline in Southern imitative activity is more than o⁄set by
the increase in the production activity of Northern multinationals who are
drawn to the South because local IPR reform renders it a more attractive
production location by reducing the risk of imitation. Third, while prices of
those goods that are reallocated from ￿rms producing in the North to multi-
nationals fall, prices of goods that are reallocated from potential imitators to
Northern multinationals increase. In other words, IPR reform in the South
has con￿ icting e⁄ects on consumer welfare when viewed solely through the
price channel. However, what actually matters for consumer welfare is pur-
chasing power. And from this viewpoint, Southern IPR reform bene￿ts the
South since it increases not only the South￿ s wage relative to the North but
also the purchasing power of Southern consumers. By contrast, not only does
the Northern relative wage decline, the real income of Northern workers also
falters. It is worth emphasizing that only a general equilibrium model such
as ours can help assess the full impact of the price changes that result from
IPR reforms since these can be o⁄set (or dominated) by the accompanying
changes in wages. Finally, when innovation is endogenous, a strengthening of
IPR protection in the South increases its rate. We should note that while the
paper does not provide a full-￿ edged welfare analysis along the lines of Help-
man (1993), the clarity with which the various channels that a⁄ect welfare
emerge in the model does shed new light on a rather complex set of issues.
6 Appendix
In this appendix, we ￿rst provide some derivations omitted from the text and
then discuss the relationship of our model to Lai (1998).
6.1 Rate of imitation with g exogenous
When g is exogenous, the equilibrium rate of imitation solves LS
d(￿;￿) = LS






























which is the same as
B + ￿C = L
S(g + ￿)
where





" < C ￿ kaIg +
￿kaI(￿ + g)
1 ￿ ￿




It is straightforward to show that ￿ increases in LS whereas it decreases in
the degree of Southern IPR protection k.
6.2 Slope of NN curve
We already noted in the main text that
@LN(￿;g)






"(￿ + ￿ + g)aN ￿ aIA(￿;g)[￿(￿ + ￿ + g) ￿ ￿]
(￿ + ￿ + g)(1 ￿ ￿)￿
"
From where it follows that a su¢ cient condition for
@LN(￿;g)
@g > 0 is that
aN
aI > 1+￿
￿" . This is because (￿ + g)[￿
"aN ￿ ￿aIA(￿;g)] > 0 due to the fact
that A(￿;g) < 1, ￿ < 1, aN ￿ aI and ￿
" > 1. Next note that the condition
aN
aI > 1+￿
￿" is satis￿ed for all feasible parameter values: since aN ￿ aI, at
the lowest feasible value of aN this condition becomes ￿
" > 1 + ￿ which
necessarily holds since ￿ > 1=￿.
6.3 Horizontal intercepts of the two curves
It is trivial to observe that neither curve can intersect the vertical axis since
labor demand in each country approaches zero as the growth rate approaches






















We assume that LS > LS.
6.4 Relationship to Lai￿ s model
Our model di⁄ers from Lai￿ s in one key respect: imitation is endogenous
in our model whereas it is exogenous in his. Setting ￿ = 1 and assuming
￿ is exogenous simpli￿es our model down to Lai￿ s. In that case, the two





















+ 1) = a￿
The following result is proved in Lai (1998): a strengthening of Southern IPR
protection (i.e. a decrease in the rate of imitation ￿) increases the Northern
rate of innovation g. The proof proceeds in a straightforward fashion: the
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